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![[image]](https://www.balancer.ru/cache/uploads/images/1247/128x128-crop/1247586-300px-sukhoi_su-30_inflight.jpg)
Su-30MK Beats F-15C 'Every Time'
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Взято с ВИФа...
Весьма интересная статья. Я порывался выложить эту инфу на свой сайт еще в начале года, но осторожность взяла верх
Кратко: боинговский филиал в Сэйнт-Люисе провел серию сложных имитаций воздушных столкновений между Су-30МК и последними модификациями Ф-15С. В каждом имитированном воздушном бое 'сушка' одержала победу как в ближнем так и в дальнем бое. 'Изюминка' заключается в сверхманевренности Су-30МК позволяющей самолету уходить от радаров наведения самолетов и ракет противника.
От себя могу добавить, что маневры 'цифрового' Су-30МК требовали пилотажа высшего класса. Однако, даже с пилотом среднего уровня подготовки или управляемый искусственным интеллектом суперкомпьютера (мощный Линукс кластер), Су-30МК одерживал верх над Ф-15С в большинстве случаев.
Все это неплохо идет с недавним интервью с Симоновым на тему сверхманевренности.
Venik
AvWeek: Su-30MK Beats F-15C 'Every Time'
By David A. Fulghum and Douglas Barrie/Aviation Week & Space Technology
24-May-2002 11:20 AM U.S. EDT
The Russian-built Sukhoi Su- 30MK, the high-performance fighter being exported to India and China, consistently beat the F-15C in classified simulations, say U.S. Air Force and aerospace industry officials.
In certain circumstances, the Su-30 can use its maneuverability, enhanced by thrust-vectoring nozzles, and speed to fool the F- 15's radar, fire two missiles and escape before the U.S. fighter can adequately respond. This is according to Air Force officials who have seen the results of extensive studies of multi-aircraft engagements conducted in a complex of 360-deg. simulation domes at Boeing's St. Louis facilities.
"The Su-30 tactic and the success of its escape maneuver permit the second, close-in shot, in case the BVR [beyond- visual-range] shot missed," an Air Force official said. Air Force analysts believe U.S. electronic warfare techniques are adequate to spoof the missile's radar. "That [second shot] is what causes concern to the F-15 community," he said. "Now, the Su-30 pilot is assured two shots plus an effective escape, which greatly increases the total engagement [kill percentage]."
THE SCENARIO in which the Su-30 "always" beats the F-15 involves the Sukhoi taking a shot with a BVR missile (like the AA-12 Adder) and then "turning into the clutter notch of the F- 15's radar," the Air Force official said. Getting into the clutter notch where the Doppler radar is ineffective involves making a descending, right-angle turn to drop below the approaching F- 15 while reducing the Su-30's relative forward speed close to zero. This is a 20-year-old air combat tactic, but the Russian fighter's maneuverability, ability to dump speed quickly and then rapidly regain acceleration allow it to execute the tactic with great effectiveness, observers said.
If the maneuver is flown correctly, the Su-30 is invisible to the F-15's Doppler radar--which depends on movement of its targets-- until the U.S. fighter gets to within range of the AA-11 Archer infrared missile. The AA-11 has a high-off-boresight capability and is used in combination with a helmet-mounted sight and a modern high-speed processor that rapidly spits out the target solution.
Positioned below the F-15, the Su-30 then uses its passive infrared sensor to frame the U.S. fighter against the sky with no background clutter. The Russian fighter then takes its second shot, this time with the IR missile, and accelerates out of danger.
"It works in the simulator every time," the Air Force official said. However, he did point out that U.S. pilots are flying both aircraft in the tests. Few countries maintain a pilot corps with the air-to- air combat skills needed to fly these scenarios, said an aerospace industry official involved in stealth fighter programs.
Those skeptical of the experiments say they're being used to justify the new Aim-9X high-off-boresight, short-range missile and its helmet-mounted cuing system, the F-22 as an air superiority fighter and, possibly, the development of a new long-range air-to-air missile that could match the F-22 radar's ability to find targets at around 120 mi. They contend that the Su-30MK can only get its BVR missile shot off first against a large radar target like the F-15. While it's true that the Su-30 MK would not succeed against the stealthy F-22 or F-35, neither would it regularly beat the nonstealthy (but relatively small radar cross section) F-16 or F/A-18E/F, they said. These analysts don't deny the F-22's value as an air-to-air fighter, but say the aircraft's actual operational value will be greatest in the penetrating strike, air defense suppression and electronic jamming roles.
At the same time, there may be more to the simulations than justifying new weaponry, say European analysts. Also at play are some tactical wrinkles being developed for the more effective use of new Russian missile versions.
The combination of Su-30 and R-27ER/ET (NATO designation AA-10), flown and fought in a competent fashion, also represents a significant threat. Even though the R-27ER is only a semiactive radar-guided missile, the extra maneuvering capability resulting from the large motor is a significant improvement over the basic R-27. Basic Russian air force doctrine has long suggested following a semi-active missile launch immediately with an IR missile launch, such as the R- 27ET. Theory has it that the target aircraft's crew will be occupied spoofing the inbound radar missile, only to fall to the second missile.
The R-27ER, while only semiactive, also outperforms the baseline R-77 (AA-12) in terms of kinematics. The R-77 motor has a simple, and short, burn profile, which has resulted in disappointing performance, piquing the Russian air force's interest in developing the K-77M rather than fielding the basic AA-12 in any numbers. The K-77M (K denotes a missile still in development, while R reflects an inventory weapon) is an upgraded R-77 with improvements that include a larger motor with a burn sequence profiled to increase range.
The oft-touted, but yet-to-be-fielded, R-27EA active variant of the AA-10 could further enhance the Su-30's capabilities, were an export customer to buy the derivative. In terms of one-on-one combat, the second-generation Flanker family presents a considerable threat to aircraft not designed from the outset as low observable, unless they are capable of extended-range BVR missile engagements. For instance, this threat drove the British selection of a rocket-ramjet missile to equip the Eurofighter.
Весьма интересная статья. Я порывался выложить эту инфу на свой сайт еще в начале года, но осторожность взяла верх
Кратко: боинговский филиал в Сэйнт-Люисе провел серию сложных имитаций воздушных столкновений между Су-30МК и последними модификациями Ф-15С. В каждом имитированном воздушном бое 'сушка' одержала победу как в ближнем так и в дальнем бое. 'Изюминка' заключается в сверхманевренности Су-30МК позволяющей самолету уходить от радаров наведения самолетов и ракет противника.
От себя могу добавить, что маневры 'цифрового' Су-30МК требовали пилотажа высшего класса. Однако, даже с пилотом среднего уровня подготовки или управляемый искусственным интеллектом суперкомпьютера (мощный Линукс кластер), Су-30МК одерживал верх над Ф-15С в большинстве случаев.
Все это неплохо идет с недавним интервью с Симоновым на тему сверхманевренности.
Venik
AvWeek: Su-30MK Beats F-15C 'Every Time'
By David A. Fulghum and Douglas Barrie/Aviation Week & Space Technology
24-May-2002 11:20 AM U.S. EDT
The Russian-built Sukhoi Su- 30MK, the high-performance fighter being exported to India and China, consistently beat the F-15C in classified simulations, say U.S. Air Force and aerospace industry officials.
In certain circumstances, the Su-30 can use its maneuverability, enhanced by thrust-vectoring nozzles, and speed to fool the F- 15's radar, fire two missiles and escape before the U.S. fighter can adequately respond. This is according to Air Force officials who have seen the results of extensive studies of multi-aircraft engagements conducted in a complex of 360-deg. simulation domes at Boeing's St. Louis facilities.
"The Su-30 tactic and the success of its escape maneuver permit the second, close-in shot, in case the BVR [beyond- visual-range] shot missed," an Air Force official said. Air Force analysts believe U.S. electronic warfare techniques are adequate to spoof the missile's radar. "That [second shot] is what causes concern to the F-15 community," he said. "Now, the Su-30 pilot is assured two shots plus an effective escape, which greatly increases the total engagement [kill percentage]."
THE SCENARIO in which the Su-30 "always" beats the F-15 involves the Sukhoi taking a shot with a BVR missile (like the AA-12 Adder) and then "turning into the clutter notch of the F- 15's radar," the Air Force official said. Getting into the clutter notch where the Doppler radar is ineffective involves making a descending, right-angle turn to drop below the approaching F- 15 while reducing the Su-30's relative forward speed close to zero. This is a 20-year-old air combat tactic, but the Russian fighter's maneuverability, ability to dump speed quickly and then rapidly regain acceleration allow it to execute the tactic with great effectiveness, observers said.
If the maneuver is flown correctly, the Su-30 is invisible to the F-15's Doppler radar--which depends on movement of its targets-- until the U.S. fighter gets to within range of the AA-11 Archer infrared missile. The AA-11 has a high-off-boresight capability and is used in combination with a helmet-mounted sight and a modern high-speed processor that rapidly spits out the target solution.
Positioned below the F-15, the Su-30 then uses its passive infrared sensor to frame the U.S. fighter against the sky with no background clutter. The Russian fighter then takes its second shot, this time with the IR missile, and accelerates out of danger.
"It works in the simulator every time," the Air Force official said. However, he did point out that U.S. pilots are flying both aircraft in the tests. Few countries maintain a pilot corps with the air-to- air combat skills needed to fly these scenarios, said an aerospace industry official involved in stealth fighter programs.
Those skeptical of the experiments say they're being used to justify the new Aim-9X high-off-boresight, short-range missile and its helmet-mounted cuing system, the F-22 as an air superiority fighter and, possibly, the development of a new long-range air-to-air missile that could match the F-22 radar's ability to find targets at around 120 mi. They contend that the Su-30MK can only get its BVR missile shot off first against a large radar target like the F-15. While it's true that the Su-30 MK would not succeed against the stealthy F-22 or F-35, neither would it regularly beat the nonstealthy (but relatively small radar cross section) F-16 or F/A-18E/F, they said. These analysts don't deny the F-22's value as an air-to-air fighter, but say the aircraft's actual operational value will be greatest in the penetrating strike, air defense suppression and electronic jamming roles.
At the same time, there may be more to the simulations than justifying new weaponry, say European analysts. Also at play are some tactical wrinkles being developed for the more effective use of new Russian missile versions.
The combination of Su-30 and R-27ER/ET (NATO designation AA-10), flown and fought in a competent fashion, also represents a significant threat. Even though the R-27ER is only a semiactive radar-guided missile, the extra maneuvering capability resulting from the large motor is a significant improvement over the basic R-27. Basic Russian air force doctrine has long suggested following a semi-active missile launch immediately with an IR missile launch, such as the R- 27ET. Theory has it that the target aircraft's crew will be occupied spoofing the inbound radar missile, only to fall to the second missile.
The R-27ER, while only semiactive, also outperforms the baseline R-77 (AA-12) in terms of kinematics. The R-77 motor has a simple, and short, burn profile, which has resulted in disappointing performance, piquing the Russian air force's interest in developing the K-77M rather than fielding the basic AA-12 in any numbers. The K-77M (K denotes a missile still in development, while R reflects an inventory weapon) is an upgraded R-77 with improvements that include a larger motor with a burn sequence profiled to increase range.
The oft-touted, but yet-to-be-fielded, R-27EA active variant of the AA-10 could further enhance the Su-30's capabilities, were an export customer to buy the derivative. In terms of one-on-one combat, the second-generation Flanker family presents a considerable threat to aircraft not designed from the outset as low observable, unless they are capable of extended-range BVR missile engagements. For instance, this threat drove the British selection of a rocket-ramjet missile to equip the Eurofighter.
muxel>...In terms of one-on-one combat, the second-generation Flanker family presents a considerable threat to aircraft not designed from the outset as low observable, unless they are capable of extended-range BVR missile engagements.
Из моего подробного общения с пилотом F-15, можно сказать, что статья написана еще очень осторожно - по его словам, не только "второе поколение представляет из себя существенную угрозу" для F-15, но в указанных условиях - БВБ один на один, при сравнимой (и именно высокой) подготовке пилотов Иглу не светит ничего против базового Су-27: Сушка маневренней на любой скорости, но на высоких - слегка, а на низких- принципиально. А в бою один на один потеря энергии не имеет такой решающей роли, как в условиях реального группового боя.
Из моего подробного общения с пилотом F-15, можно сказать, что статья написана еще очень осторожно - по его словам, не только "второе поколение представляет из себя существенную угрозу" для F-15, но в указанных условиях - БВБ один на один, при сравнимой (и именно высокой) подготовке пилотов Иглу не светит ничего против базового Су-27: Сушка маневренней на любой скорости, но на высоких - слегка, а на низких- принципиально. А в бою один на один потеря энергии не имеет такой решающей роли, как в условиях реального группового боя.
Вале, не в кассу. На сегодняшний день армия США получает практически всё что попросит. Время такое. Новости не смотрим?
AGRESSOR>Другое дело, сколько (в случае противостояния) мы сможем выставить Су-30, а сколько амы - своих Ф-15С. Как говорится, семеро одного не боятся, особенно если он связанный и побитый.
А кстати сколько у РФ Су -30 в строю ?
А кстати сколько у РФ Су -30 в строю ?
Су-30 штук пять. Только это совсем не Су-30МК(И)
>На сегодняшний день армия США получает практически всё что попросит. Время такое. Новости не смотрим?
Гы... Похоже Вы действительно новости не смотрите, уважаемый au ВС США как раз очень много чего просят, но их посылают регулярно. Crusader, F-22 это вот самые последние примеры.
Гы... Похоже Вы действительно новости не смотрите, уважаемый au
ВС США как раз очень много чего просят, но их посылают регулярно. Crusader, F-22 это вот самые последние примеры.
Денег много не бывает...
Талибов давить хватило бы и B-52,Ирак - B-1. А летать хочется на новом.
Талибов давить хватило бы и B-52,Ирак - B-1. А летать хочется на новом.
_Vale>Денег много не бывает...
_Vale>Талибов давить хватило бы и B-52,Ирак - B-1. А летать хочется на новом.
Тоже не в кассу. С талибами или без, Б-52 будут летать минимум до 40х годов, Б1,2 - тоже примерно до тех пор.
Никита: это не "посылают". Это завихрения в мозгах и конфликтующие интересы. Несостоявшийся крусейдер не помешал появиться колёсным "танкам", на которые у войск явно не хватает возможностей английского в плане мата. Могу продемонстрировать, если интересно. И это только часть одной неумной концепции развития наземных сил, которая сейчас в моде у них. Войска её ненавидят в зародыше, но командуют ведь генералы. Но суть в том, что хоть за раздел денег и сражаются, но это вовсе не то же самое что их недодают.
_Vale>Талибов давить хватило бы и B-52,Ирак - B-1. А летать хочется на новом.
Тоже не в кассу. С талибами или без, Б-52 будут летать минимум до 40х годов, Б1,2 - тоже примерно до тех пор.
Никита: это не "посылают". Это завихрения в мозгах и конфликтующие интересы. Несостоявшийся крусейдер не помешал появиться колёсным "танкам", на которые у войск явно не хватает возможностей английского в плане мата. Могу продемонстрировать, если интересно. И это только часть одной неумной концепции развития наземных сил, которая сейчас в моде у них. Войска её ненавидят в зародыше, но командуют ведь генералы. Но суть в том, что хоть за раздел денег и сражаются, но это вовсе не то же самое что их недодают.
Nikita>Су-30 штук пять. Только это совсем не Су-30МК(И)
ПЯТЬ ? Мрак. А МК только на экспорт ,так ? ТОгда результаты этих тестов не очень греют душу.
ПЯТЬ ? Мрак. А МК только на экспорт ,так ? ТОгда результаты этих тестов не очень греют душу.
>Это завихрения в мозгах и конфликтующие интересы.
Гы... Это все разумеется имеет место быть, но основа этого - ограниченность средств.
>Несостоявшийся крусейдер не помешал появиться колёсным "танкам",
Ну еще бы, ведь все наоборот было. Crusader'у помешали Stryker'ы, а точнее концепция стоящая за ними.
>на которые у войск явно не хватает возможностей английского в плане мата.
У танкистов может быть, а вот товарищи которых с M113 каких-нибудь пересаживают, наоборот очень довольны.
>И это только часть одной неумной концепции развития наземных сил, которая сейчас в моде у них.
Не разделяю Вашего пессимизма. На мой взгляд концепция вполне нормальная.
>Войска её ненавидят в зародыше, но командуют ведь генералы.
Войска всегда отторгают новое. Никому не хочется переучиваться на новые системы, а в особенности переходить на новые концепции ведения боевых действий.
>Но суть в том, что хоть за раздел денег и сражаются, но это вовсе не то же самое что их недодают.
Да вот не надо. ВС США как раз были бы не против получить и тех и других, и еще чего-нибудь впридачу, но им приходится делать выбор, так как на все не хватает.
Гы... Это все разумеется имеет место быть, но основа этого - ограниченность средств.
>Несостоявшийся крусейдер не помешал появиться колёсным "танкам",
Ну еще бы, ведь все наоборот было. Crusader'у помешали Stryker'ы, а точнее концепция стоящая за ними.
>на которые у войск явно не хватает возможностей английского в плане мата.
У танкистов может быть, а вот товарищи которых с M113 каких-нибудь пересаживают, наоборот очень довольны.
>И это только часть одной неумной концепции развития наземных сил, которая сейчас в моде у них.
Не разделяю Вашего пессимизма. На мой взгляд концепция вполне нормальная.
>Войска её ненавидят в зародыше, но командуют ведь генералы.
Войска всегда отторгают новое. Никому не хочется переучиваться на новые системы, а в особенности переходить на новые концепции ведения боевых действий.
>Но суть в том, что хоть за раздел денег и сражаются, но это вовсе не то же самое что их недодают.
Да вот не надо. ВС США как раз были бы не против получить и тех и других, и еще чего-нибудь впридачу, но им приходится делать выбор, так как на все не хватает.
>А МК только на экспорт ,так ?
Угу. И то пока только две штуки отправили. Может до конца года у индийцев будет десяток.
Угу. И то пока только две штуки отправили. Может до конца года у индийцев будет десяток.
Nikita>У танкистов может быть, а вот товарищи которых с M113 каких-нибудь пересаживают, наоборот очень довольны.
Nikita>Не разделяю Вашего пессимизма. На мой взгляд концепция вполне нормальная.
Пессимизм не мой. Пессимизм исходит от непосредственных "пострадавших". Чтобы не быть голословным:
[QUOTE] Update: Report on the ‘Stryker’ at NTC
Editor’s Note: The following memorandum provided to DefenseWatch contributor Michael Sparks by an anonymous Army officer unofficially assesses the initial performance of the U.S. Army “Stryker” Interim Armored Vehicle at the ongoing “Millennium Challenge 2002” exercise at the National Training Center. (See also “Strykers Boost Infantry Tactics at NTC,” by Sgt. Kim Dooley and Pvt. Sara Wood, Army News Service, Aug. 6, 2002, and “Guest Column: Cancel Stryker, Upgrade the M113,” by Michael L. Sparks, DefenseWatch, June 19, 2002.
Memorandum
Evidently, the Army flew in IAVs on C-17s during Millenium Challenge. C-130 certification evidently still a problem. IAV reliability and capability still rumored to be lacking.
NTC was ordered to support [Millenium Challenge 2002] MC02. It was told to provide whatever support JFCOM required. Trouble is JFCOM does not know what it wants. Does know what it does not want.
OPFOR waxing the Stryker company or Blueforce brigade. OPFOR allowed only one Stryker kill per engagement, and is a considerably weaker OPFOR than a regular rotation. Also not allowed to attack without permission from JFCOM/JTF. Big events are a light battalion airdrop to secure Bicycle lake. C-17 air landing of 4 Strykers (2 per plane), an attack against a small remnant of an OPFOR regiment, securing an area for the SOF to dismantle a weapon of mass effects, and a live-fire.
The infantry O/Cs [observer-controllers] (Tarantulas) are managing the operation. Light units have FBCB2 in their TOCs, (which will not move during the rotation) but no land warrior, no digital connect. One light battalion is at NTC the other two are added via virtual simulation. Not clear if the other two battalions are going to be used.
Air drop of light infantry to secure the landing field (Bicycle lake) was done with 12 C-130s loaded with a total of about 600 soldiers and two artillery tube drop packages. Drop started at 2:10 am. First drops were the artillery. Then for the next 45 minutes the battalion dropped from the sky.
OPFOR was in position to lob motors at the rather noisy and bright airdrop, but was not allowed. Lots of VIPs watching from bleachers (over 200 generals scheduled to visit NTC during MC02). Drop was very impressive, even when viewed via Low light TV. Only 3 soldiers and two O/Cs injured in the drop.
Took a long time to regroup on the ground. At 4 am, the Tarantulas were still trying to figure out who had jumped, location of units and injury list. The blueforce soldiers were still wandering/regrouping on Bicycle lake. Looked like another hour before they would be ready for combat. Majority of OPFOR were out of direct and indirect fire range. Looked like a company minus of OPFOR. Some engagements/clashes with OPFOR planned for that day. HUMMWV surrogates for the mobile gun system will be principle blueforce fire power.
The Stryker airlift was delayed because the AF wanted to land under limited vis[ability] conditions so the whole rotation/demo was delayed about a day. No problem the OPFOR was more than happy to be finally allowed to use its mortars. AF had not delivered any Q-16 counterbattery radars so the blueforce got mangled up in front of a lot of VIPs. Another example of the fine joint sprit that permeates the experiment.
Nikita>Не разделяю Вашего пессимизма. На мой взгляд концепция вполне нормальная.
Пессимизм не мой. Пессимизм исходит от непосредственных "пострадавших". Чтобы не быть голословным:
[QUOTE] Update: Report on the ‘Stryker’ at NTC
Editor’s Note: The following memorandum provided to DefenseWatch contributor Michael Sparks by an anonymous Army officer unofficially assesses the initial performance of the U.S. Army “Stryker” Interim Armored Vehicle at the ongoing “Millennium Challenge 2002” exercise at the National Training Center. (See also “Strykers Boost Infantry Tactics at NTC,” by Sgt. Kim Dooley and Pvt. Sara Wood, Army News Service, Aug. 6, 2002, and “Guest Column: Cancel Stryker, Upgrade the M113,” by Michael L. Sparks, DefenseWatch, June 19, 2002.
Memorandum
Evidently, the Army flew in IAVs on C-17s during Millenium Challenge. C-130 certification evidently still a problem. IAV reliability and capability still rumored to be lacking.
NTC was ordered to support [Millenium Challenge 2002] MC02. It was told to provide whatever support JFCOM required. Trouble is JFCOM does not know what it wants. Does know what it does not want.
OPFOR waxing the Stryker company or Blueforce brigade. OPFOR allowed only one Stryker kill per engagement, and is a considerably weaker OPFOR than a regular rotation. Also not allowed to attack without permission from JFCOM/JTF. Big events are a light battalion airdrop to secure Bicycle lake. C-17 air landing of 4 Strykers (2 per plane), an attack against a small remnant of an OPFOR regiment, securing an area for the SOF to dismantle a weapon of mass effects, and a live-fire.
The infantry O/Cs [observer-controllers] (Tarantulas) are managing the operation. Light units have FBCB2 in their TOCs, (which will not move during the rotation) but no land warrior, no digital connect. One light battalion is at NTC the other two are added via virtual simulation. Not clear if the other two battalions are going to be used.
Air drop of light infantry to secure the landing field (Bicycle lake) was done with 12 C-130s loaded with a total of about 600 soldiers and two artillery tube drop packages. Drop started at 2:10 am. First drops were the artillery. Then for the next 45 minutes the battalion dropped from the sky.
OPFOR was in position to lob motors at the rather noisy and bright airdrop, but was not allowed. Lots of VIPs watching from bleachers (over 200 generals scheduled to visit NTC during MC02). Drop was very impressive, even when viewed via Low light TV. Only 3 soldiers and two O/Cs injured in the drop.
Took a long time to regroup on the ground. At 4 am, the Tarantulas were still trying to figure out who had jumped, location of units and injury list. The blueforce soldiers were still wandering/regrouping on Bicycle lake. Looked like another hour before they would be ready for combat. Majority of OPFOR were out of direct and indirect fire range. Looked like a company minus of OPFOR. Some engagements/clashes with OPFOR planned for that day. HUMMWV surrogates for the mobile gun system will be principle blueforce fire power.
The Stryker airlift was delayed because the AF wanted to land under limited vis[ability] conditions so the whole rotation/demo was delayed about a day. No problem the OPFOR was more than happy to be finally allowed to use its mortars. AF had not delivered any Q-16 counterbattery radars so the blueforce got mangled up in front of a lot of VIPs. Another example of the fine joint sprit that permeates the experiment.
[ слишком длинный топик - автонарезка ]
Fort Lewis notes:
1. Approximately 20 Strykers are “down” every day, and the sight of one towing another is routine.
2. The Stryker mortar vehicle does not support the 120mm mortar, and we have heard the Army has decided to use a smaller mortar (don't know whether it is an 81mm or the 107mm.) so they can actually fire something from the vehicle. Odds are it’s the 81mm, but we are checking.
3. In order to traverse the barrier that has been set up for the test, the IAV has to actually hit the wall at 2-3 mph and bounce over. The M113 noses into the wall and gently climbs it. Effect on the troops in the IAV of being bounced is unknown, but all were seen wearing their helmets all the time. The same thing happens on the cross country course.
4. The effort by the 100-man GD “dealer prep” team takes place in two Chinook hangars, and the effort is significant. Power packs are lifted, parts are added and replaced, and other “production” processes are performed.
5. The remotely-fired Mk-19 [grenade launcher] on the IAV was fired for a safety certification. It fired five rounds. One went 40 meters left of target, one went forty yards right of target, and crews are looking for the other three. All firing anywhere of this system is suspended. Firing portion of the test has been delayed to September.
Additional stuff from CE evaluation of the M113:
1. M113s go around the driver's course. LAVs cannot keep up. It is dry.
2. LAVs drive around a hill, while the M113s go straight over it.
3. An LAV nosed into a ditch and got stuck. Another LAV came over to winch it out. In the process, the winch broke. The M113 drives right over the ditch.
4. Senior officers do not attend any of the meetings. Could it be that they see an impending morale dilemma that can be avoided by not being in attendance?
5. Teasers: IAV restricted to 40 mph on roads, 15 mph cross country, with strong emphasis on keeping everybody's helmet on, nobody can operate the APU or winches without contractor check-out first. Some of this is safety related stuff that is waiting for testing to be complete, and the normal reaction by Army safety folks is to keep restrictions on until testing (i.e., someone else) recommends the restriction be lifted. CYA stuff, not to be considered serious. On the other hand, many of these items seem to have derived from actual experience in earlier operation as problems, and there are “fix” dates projected, which indicates a design flaw or GD inability to optimize competing priorities for the “ilities.” One thing is obvious: the Army's depiction of the IAV as providing a more relaxed, comfortable, and prepared soldier to the battlefield because the ride is better is beyond reality.
6. Four Remote Weapons Stations were removed from deprocessed Stryker vehicles this weekend to support the Millennium Challenge exercise at the National Training Center. It's been reported that the RWS's develop problems after firing 12K-15K rounds of ammunition. Officers also indicate that the load planning challenge is significantly greater on the Stryker than the M113A3. Company commanders saying they cannot fit an MTO&E platoon into 4 Strykers.
Sparks, a former Marine Corps officer now serving in the U.S. Army Reserve, is director of the nonprofit 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne), a research institute focusing on new equipment and tactics for the Army. He can be reached at itsg
hotmail.com. [/QUOTE]
Есть и ещё, но в ещё менее оптимистических тонах, и тоже от вполне компетентных источников.
1. Approximately 20 Strykers are “down” every day, and the sight of one towing another is routine.
2. The Stryker mortar vehicle does not support the 120mm mortar, and we have heard the Army has decided to use a smaller mortar (don't know whether it is an 81mm or the 107mm.) so they can actually fire something from the vehicle. Odds are it’s the 81mm, but we are checking.
3. In order to traverse the barrier that has been set up for the test, the IAV has to actually hit the wall at 2-3 mph and bounce over. The M113 noses into the wall and gently climbs it. Effect on the troops in the IAV of being bounced is unknown, but all were seen wearing their helmets all the time. The same thing happens on the cross country course.
4. The effort by the 100-man GD “dealer prep” team takes place in two Chinook hangars, and the effort is significant. Power packs are lifted, parts are added and replaced, and other “production” processes are performed.
5. The remotely-fired Mk-19 [grenade launcher] on the IAV was fired for a safety certification. It fired five rounds. One went 40 meters left of target, one went forty yards right of target, and crews are looking for the other three. All firing anywhere of this system is suspended. Firing portion of the test has been delayed to September.
Additional stuff from CE evaluation of the M113:
1. M113s go around the driver's course. LAVs cannot keep up. It is dry.
2. LAVs drive around a hill, while the M113s go straight over it.
3. An LAV nosed into a ditch and got stuck. Another LAV came over to winch it out. In the process, the winch broke. The M113 drives right over the ditch.
4. Senior officers do not attend any of the meetings. Could it be that they see an impending morale dilemma that can be avoided by not being in attendance?
5. Teasers: IAV restricted to 40 mph on roads, 15 mph cross country, with strong emphasis on keeping everybody's helmet on, nobody can operate the APU or winches without contractor check-out first. Some of this is safety related stuff that is waiting for testing to be complete, and the normal reaction by Army safety folks is to keep restrictions on until testing (i.e., someone else) recommends the restriction be lifted. CYA stuff, not to be considered serious. On the other hand, many of these items seem to have derived from actual experience in earlier operation as problems, and there are “fix” dates projected, which indicates a design flaw or GD inability to optimize competing priorities for the “ilities.” One thing is obvious: the Army's depiction of the IAV as providing a more relaxed, comfortable, and prepared soldier to the battlefield because the ride is better is beyond reality.
6. Four Remote Weapons Stations were removed from deprocessed Stryker vehicles this weekend to support the Millennium Challenge exercise at the National Training Center. It's been reported that the RWS's develop problems after firing 12K-15K rounds of ammunition. Officers also indicate that the load planning challenge is significantly greater on the Stryker than the M113A3. Company commanders saying they cannot fit an MTO&E platoon into 4 Strykers.
Sparks, a former Marine Corps officer now serving in the U.S. Army Reserve, is director of the nonprofit 1st Tactical Studies Group (Airborne), a research institute focusing on new equipment and tactics for the Army. He can be reached at itsg
hotmail.com. [/QUOTE]Есть и ещё, но в ещё менее оптимистических тонах, и тоже от вполне компетентных источников.
Nikita> и еще чего-нибудь впридачу, но им приходится делать выбор, так как на все не хватает.
Как вы думаете, на какой цифре (бюджете) это явление исчезнет? Триллиона не хватит - уверяю вас. Кажущиеся потребности растут быстрее возможностей. Всегда.
Как вы думаете, на какой цифре (бюджете) это явление исчезнет?
Триллиона не хватит - уверяю вас. Кажущиеся потребности растут быстрее возможностей. Всегда.
>Пессимизм не мой. Пессимизм исходит от непосредственных "пострадавших". Чтобы не быть голословным:
Ну и ? Все выше процитированое демонстрирует лишь то что Stryker очень сырая машина, а BCT находятся в самой начальной стадии формирования, один более-менее реальный батальон вон всего смогли наскребсти для учений
Вы лучше о концепции что-нибудь интересное напишите.
>Как вы думаете, на какой цифре (бюджете) это явление исчезнет? Триллиона не хватит - уверяю вас.
Гы... Так о том и речь. Ресурсов всегда не хватает. И в этом я с Вами полностью согласен.
Ну и ? Все выше процитированое демонстрирует лишь то что Stryker очень сырая машина, а BCT находятся в самой начальной стадии формирования, один более-менее реальный батальон вон всего смогли наскребсти для учений
Вы лучше о концепции что-нибудь интересное напишите.>Как вы думаете, на какой цифре (бюджете) это явление исчезнет? Триллиона не хватит - уверяю вас.
Гы... Так о том и речь. Ресурсов всегда не хватает. И в этом я с Вами полностью согласен.
Другое дело, сколько (в случае противостояния) мы сможем выставить Су-30, а сколько амы - своих Ф-15С. Как говорится, семеро одного не боятся, особенно если он связанный и побитый.
Опять 25. Ключевое слово - simulations!
Если военным нужны будут деньги, они насимулируют, что локатор МиГ-23 увидит F-22 за 1000 км, в ангаре.
Если военным нужны будут деньги, они насимулируют, что локатор МиГ-23 увидит F-22 за 1000 км, в ангаре.
Да сравнивали уже, до полного озвизденения...
БиБиСя
новичок
Здраствуйте Товарищи,
Типа я тут новый. Обитаю у Бразда. Ник тот же. Вот прочитал в статье: "neither would it regularly beat the nonstealthy (but relatively small radar cross section) F-16"
Вам не кажется такое заявление абсурдным?
Типа я тут новый. Обитаю у Бразда. Ник тот же. Вот прочитал в статье: "neither would it regularly beat the nonstealthy (but relatively small radar cross section) F-16"
Вам не кажется такое заявление абсурдным?
Jedi
втянувшийся
Кажется, но никто внимания не обращает т.к. привыкли что в конце подобных статеечек последний абзац пишется для успокоения звездно-полосатых налогоплательщиков...
БиБиСя
новичок
Да уж статеечка... а что подразумевается под "relatively small radar cross section"? Малая заметность что-ли? Типа это должно ему помочь победить Су-30МК?
Там две трети статьи всяческие домыслы. Интерес представляют только первые абзацы где цитируются участники моделирования.
БиБиСя>а что подразумевается под "relatively small radar cross section"?
Может быть "... selection"?
Может быть "... selection"?
Реклама Google — средство выживания форумов :)
БиБиСя>>а что подразумевается под "relatively small radar cross section"?
Конструктор>Может быть "... selection"?
rcs = radar cross section = эпр = эффективная поверхность рассеяния
Конструктор>Может быть "... selection"?
rcs = radar cross section = эпр = эффективная поверхность рассеяния
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Создано 10.08.2002
Связь с владельцами и администрацией сайта: anonisimov@gmail.com, rwasp1957@yandex.ru и admin@balancer.ru.
Создано 10.08.2002
Связь с владельцами и администрацией сайта: anonisimov@gmail.com, rwasp1957@yandex.ru и admin@balancer.ru.
