F-15 и F-16 - как это было?

Militarist>Да, Иглы тоже умели бросать чугунки, но Фалконы делали это лучше.Их прицелы были лучше для работы по земле.
EvgenyVB> тогда ссылочку приведите, что на период этой операции все было именно так.

Одну ссылочку я уже привел раньше:
Militarist> “Close Air Support” by Peter Smith. New York: Orion books, 1990. “…Some idea of the importance of the attack mission for the F-16A can be gained from its rather basic APG-66 radar which nevertheless had no fewer than seven air-to-ground modes. These included real-beam ground mapping, expanded real-beam ground mapping, Doppler beam sharpening, air-to-ground ranging, sea surface search and freeze, the last of which enables the picture on the plan position indicator in the cockpit to remain the same as on the last sweep, showing the aircraft’s progress across the screen and allowing the radar to be put on standby until next needed."

А вот ещё одна: “Designed for the kill” by Mike Spick. UK: Airlife, 1995.

"In its original form, the APG-66 had 11 modes, 4 of them air-to-air, the rest – air-to-surface or navigation".

Yacc> Не порите чушь, ей больно... Исполнительные устройства в том и том случае - гидравлика. Золотниками подачи и там и там управляют электромагниты в режиме автоматического бомбометания.

Перед гидравликой ещё кое-что есть.

Информация из нижеприведенного источника:

“The F-16 is a lightweight tactical fighter with exceptional maneuverability. It utilizes a state-of-the-art “fly-by-wire” system of electrical controls instead of the conventional mechanical linkages. This enables the airplane to respond quicker and more accurately”.

Militarist> То есть один тянет, скажем, на один процент сильнее, чем другой.
Yacc> Это компенсируется рулями. Бомбардировщики же вообще многодвигательные.

Для бомберов это не так актуально. А компенсация рулями не рулит. Рулит один движок. Если мы говорим о тонкостях этого дела.

Yacc> Особенно - в воздушном бою без ПТБ. В ударной конфигурации с тяжелым грузом для приемлемого радиуса надо тащить ПТБ.

А кому не надо? Если даже так!

Militarist> по ней вполне можно судить о боевом потенциале Фалкона - его 'дальнобойности', грузоподъемности, надежности его двигателя, способности метать чугуний.
Yacc> О всем этом судят по статистике, собранной на основе регулярных применений в такой конфигурации. Одна точка ничего не дает.

Militarist> Ну, тут я с вами категорически не согласен. Использование Ф-16 по наземным целям, это вовсе никакая не проба и не эксперимент. Он с момента поступления в войска был предназначен и для наземных целей тоже.

Yacc> Практических доказательств подчеркнутой фразы до 1986 года я не увидел. Даже на примере Израиля, который его тем не менее очень успешно использовал как истребитель.

Я знаю, что выкладывать большое кол-во текста на иностранном языке не приветствуется, но текст информативный и достаточно много народу способного его осилить. А если у кого возникнут трудности, многие могут помочь. В общем выкладываю.

“The lessons of modern war” (volume 1) by A. Cordesman and A. Wagner.

San Francisco: Westview Press, 1990.

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Сперва об ударах по наземным целям в долине Бекаа и участии в них Ф-16:

“Most accounts agree that the rear-area mission was accomplished by a combination of F-16s with conventional and cluster bombs and F-4s with Shrike and Standard ARM missiles”.

“Israel used the extremely accurate bombing computers on its F-16s and Kfirs to send conventional iron and cluster bombs against the SA-8 and SA-9 units tracked with RPVs.
The F-16 was in particular effective due to its high speed and ability to escape the target area”.

“At the same time, Israeli F-4 and F-16 fighters flew extensive chaff and flare missions virtually blanketing the area. These warplanes were equipped with active jamming pods with updated versions of the Wild Weasel technology the US developed for the F-4G and Israeli systems Elta EL/M-2001B.”

“The end result was that the IDF killed 17 of 19 SA-6 Syrian missile sites in the Bekaa and several SA-2 and SA-3 sites. It was accomplished in no more than 20 minutes of active combat. The IAF also deserves credit for its ability to suppress the SA-7, SA-8 and SA-9”.

Отсюда следует, что Ф-16 aктивно применялись против наземных целей.

Кое-что ещё:

The IAF used its F-15s to provide autonomous search and forward control in detail. Israel has modified the original US advanced radar processing system that provides automatic detection, target acquisition and clutter suppression to meet its needs. This means improved coverage of ground targets and special software to allow joint operation with other Israeli sensor and early warning (AW) aircraft in air-defense-suppression and air-defense operations.

The Israeli E-2C evidently had also modified ALR59 passive detection systems tailored to provide ELINT and ESM capabilities that matched the electronic orders of battle of Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. This doubles some aspects of the E-2C detection range as well as provides a function missing from any version of the E-3A. Similar modifications or add-ons seem to exist for the E-2C’s Litton L-304 computer.

The Israeli 707 ECM aircraft is both an electronic warfare and a command post aircraft and is semi-palletized (полуавтоматизирован) to allow specific configuration for a given mission. These 707 ECM aircraft had ECM capabilities that far outclassed the limited frequency agility of the SA-6 and could use data from the Mastiff RPV and alter its jamming patterns against systems like the SA-6 in near real time. Israel also equipped these aircraft with a sophisticated microprocessor-controlled exciter manufactured by Elta. This is called the E1/K7012 and allows the Israelis to use selective rather than barrage or noise jamming with minimal out-of-phase noise or spurious emission. This gives Israel an immunity to self-jamming which is SUPERIOR to that of any NATO country.

Israel deployed a mix of RPVs designed to force the Syrian units to activate their radars and engage them while other RPVs were sent to observe critical targets and provide real time ELINT on key units such as the SA-6. Some of these RPVs were specially adapted to give the radar profile and speed of Israeli fighters and so forced the Syrians to fire at them. This allowed to pinpoint the Syrian SAM radars for IAF strikes at them with anti-radiation missiles. The Israelis also used launched from F-4s Samson drones which had a radar signature and speed very close to IAF fighters.

Israeli artillery batteries also hit at Syrian radar, SAM and other air-defense sites and sustained the initial surge of fire by carefully planned harassment fire throughout the attack. There are reports that Israel specially modified its A-4 Skyhawks to suppress and attack ZSU-23-4 radar-guided AA guns. In addition, Israeli fighters were supported by Avra Stol 202 forward ECM aircraft. This is a light aircraft carrying a dedicated jammer. The Israelis also used Beech aircraft as forward ELINT collectors as well as CH-53 helicopters with airborne jammers.

While Israel established its full active and passive ECM blanket, low-flying fighters popped up from the blind spot in the Syrian radar coverage behind the southwestern mountain line of the Bekaa valley and began to use Standard, Shrike and Israeli-made anti-radiation missiles and electro-optical missiles like Maverick against the larger Syrian missile sites such as the SA-6 sites. This allowed Israel to hit key sites in several different ways at once. There are reports that Israel also used developmental laser illuminators on some RPVs to illuminate the most difficult targets and eliminate the need for fighter guidance of electro-optical after lock-on. This greatly improved missile accuracy and warplane survivability.

In the attacks on SAM sites in the Bekaa valley, IAF Boeing E-707s provided stand-off jamming to distort ground-based radar signals associated with the SA-6 missiles. This was a direct response to the Israeli experience with the SA-6 in 1973. It was reported that over 300 SAMs were fired in 1982 Lebanon war in spite of the SAM suppression effort but according to witnesses SAMs were frequently out of control immediately after launch as a result of jamming.
It became clear from various sources that the Soviets were surprised by the failure of their new missiles to be more effective than the SA-6. After the visit of Soviet Chief of General Staff marshal Ogarkov to Damascus in 1982, they deployed in Syria the SA-8 and SA-9 for a post-mortem on what had gone wrong with the SA-6. But the Israelis managed to knock out the SA-8 and SA-9 just as easily as the SA-6 with new air strikes on August 10 and again on September 8, 9 and 13. This outcome made the Soviets deploy the SA-5 in January 1983 as a threat to Israel’s E-2C and other sensor and electronic warfare platforms but the SA-5 system has not yet been tested in combat.

The Israelis monitored their activities in real time with their Scout and Mastiff RPVs and ELINT aircraft. They also used computer vans to help coordinate the land portion of the operations.
The IAF made excellent use of visual detection, flares and other decoy techniques, reduced-vulnerability attack profiles, threat location and its avoidance, aircraft-to-aircraft warning and evasive action. Its overall success is still surprising given the number of air defense systems in PLO and Syrian hands.

The IAF was far more effective in the close support role in the 1982 than in 1973. Israeli close air support started even before IDF ground troops advanced on 6 June 1982. Spearheading formations advanced under the umbrella of air support from A-4 Skyhawks, F-4E Phantoms and Kfirs on both the coastal and central fronts. The decisive destruction of the Syrian SAMs and fighters gave Israel a high degree of freedom of action. The IAF then systematically exploited every opportunity. It was able to respond quickly and effectively to support the ground forces during the IDF’s advance north and this support continued throughout the fight for the Beirut-Damascus Road. On one occasion, a Syrian armored brigade was caught while moving to the front in Lebanon from Syria and was completely destroyed by Israeli air force interdiction. On another occasion, the Syrians were denied a chance to consolidate a superior defensive position because of strikes by Israeli warplanes. The single Israeli aircraft casualty during the close support effort was an A-4 Skyhawk which was attacking targets in the Lebanese town of Nabatiyah. The plane was shot down by a PLO shoulder-fired SA-7 missile and the pilot was taken prisoner. This was an incredible performance given the hundreds of SA-7s fired during such attacks and the large numbers of antiaircraft guns in PLO and Syrian forces. On the Syrian side, on the other hand, there were only a few sporadic attacks by Su-7s and helicopters.
There is no doubt that the Israelis made substantial improvements in their operational effectiveness in the CAS role after 1973. The IAF clearly benefited from years of research, development and training in the close support area. Much of this improvement was the result of new C3 assets such as RPVs providing near real time damage reports and of enhanced performance of aircraft weapons.

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Вот ещё попалась под руку тут такая любопытная информация, которая тоже иногда вызывает споры:

“The Israelis did not use their own surface-to-air missiles extensively in 1982 but it is important to note that they made important modifications to their Hawk missiles. The Israeli Hawks had radar and guidance software that allowed intercepts at up to 70,000 feet (21 km). An Israeli Hawk battery in Lebanon shot down a MiG-25 flying at such an altitude at Mach 2.5 on 30 August 1982. They also in the mid-1970s added to the Hawks a $30,000 Super Eye electro-optical detector to provide detection at ranges up to 30 – 40 km which helped to deal with ECM and IFF problems. According to one report, there were two confirmed cases in 1982 when this system prevented Israeli units from firing on their own aircraft”.

И про БПЛА кое-что выбрал, но там очень много об этом:

“The RPVs proved to be of consistent value in providing survivable information for land weapons and fighter attack missions. Not only they provided targeting data, but they also provided an independent source of information that, for example, allowed Israeli fighters to approach their targets from a less vulnerable direction and to clear the target area (покинуть район боя) without waiting to observe the effect of their activity”.

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О воздушных боях:

“The details of Israel’s astounding victory in the air are no less impressive than those in its suppression of Syrian SAMs. Syrian best aircraft attacked Israeli warplanes but the Syrians knew that Israeli E-2Cs could detect Syrian fighters the moment they left the runway and that Israeli fighters carried jam-resistant radios and were able to communicate through secure voice and data links despite Syrian jamming efforts. In practice, the Syrian fighters lost both communications and long-range radar coverage long before they came within combat range of Israeli fighters. While being critically dependent on ground controlled intercept tactics, they attempted mass air combat under conditions where they could not establish reliable communications with the ground and Syrian ground sites could not provide useful radar coverage or vectoring. The Syrian pilots flew random search patterns. After they saw Israeli fighters, they flew straight intercept profiles or simple jigs which made them very predictable. They seemed unable to fly complex small formations and broke up into pairs when they were threatened with attack. As even best Syrian fighters MiG-23 lacked a look-up and look-down capability, they were forced to fly in a peculiar high-low formation where the higher and lower formations acted as each other’s AWACS, a tactic that becomes hopeless the moment either group gets engaged. This was an ideal killing area for Israeli F-15 and F-16 fighters. The radar interface ability of E-2C and F-15 has proved to be of critical importance. The E-2C plays the role of battle management, integrating all of the relevant incoming data with computers able to analyze and automatically communicate with on-board systems in the F-15. The F-15 acts as an autonomous air-controller. Together they can vector other F-15s and F-16s to near perfect engagement positions. There is no doubt that this capability gives the IAF an important advantage over less sophisticated systems where interceptor-fighter pilots have to rely on ground-based radar information.

Not only the Israelis actively jammed Syrian aircraft radars and communications but in addition the Syrian warplanes were unable to deal with the prior Israeli use of chaff whereas the Israeli fighters could handle that well.
Israel also made good use of new ground C3 centers. It had a new regional GCI center at Kafr Malik with both early warning and ESM/ELINT capabilities. There was also an effective central command and two other regional command centers. In practice, the regional center acted as the key battle management center for air-to-air, SAM and SHORAD operations. While the exact configuration of such centers is secret, they have digital data links to Israel’s E-2Cc and -707s and advanced computers and automatic displays. They may have a 657-11 system similar to the Cobalt Grande system in Spain. And they definitely have air controllers with years of practical combat experience. The Israeli fighters operated as part of a fully integrated air control and warning system. The Israeli pilots had effective individual countermeasures such as the EL/L-2000 sets, secure and counter-measure-proof Tadiran radios, better radars and avionics, an advanced concept of operations and clear tactics, and vastly superior training and experience. The Israelis also possessed far superior infrared Sidewinder AIM-9L and Python-3 air-to-air missiles effective at ranges 6 to 11 miles and capable of side intercepts. At longer distances the Israeli pilots could use AIM-7E and F Sparrow with ranges respectively of 14 and 25 miles. Although they were not in particular effective killers, they served their tactical purpose bringing Syrian aircraft under fire long before the Syrians could fire back, disarraying their formations and occasionally even causing the pilots to eject. The situation had already shown the Syrians that they could not operate their MiG-25s in Israeli-controlled air space. The loss of two MiG-25 fighters and one MiG-25 recce was obviously a factor that led Syria to keep its MiG-25s out of the fight.
However, even with these advantages it is still striking that the Israeli C3I system proved able to bring the elements of this superiority together at so many different levels. The importance of such C3I capability is illustrated by the fact that Israel as a rule did not pursue combat across the Syrian border and had no more than two minutes to strike at Syrian fighters between the time they entered the Bekaa and then swept back into Syrian airspace. Nevertheless, Israeli sources claim 90% of air-to-air kills occurred in the Bekaa.
Israel killed 22 or 23 Syrian aircraft during the initial air-defense-suppression effort on 9 June 1982 and damaged seven more. The IAF killed 25 more aircraft and 3 helicopters on 10 June 1982 and shot down 18 more Syrian aircraft on 11 June before a temporary cease-fire, bringing its total to 79 to 82 Syrian fighters as against two Israeli fighters, a Skyhawk to an SA-8. The other losses were an F-4 and several helicopters. This raised the total of the Syrian losses in aircraft to 92 by the time the war was over.
In the end, the Israeli F-16s accounted for 44 kills during the fighting in June and July. The F-15s killed 40 and an F-4 killed one.The AIM-9L accounted for most kills. Cannon accounted for 7%. Of the 85 kills, half were MiG-21s and half MiG-23s.
While Syria briefly claimed that it had shot down 19 Israeli aircraft on 11 June 1982, Arab sources indicate that the Syrian high command had no real illusions. Syria immediately appealed to Moscow for help. It is also clear that the claimed Syrian kills were not claimed by the surviving pilots but originated at the policy level within the Syrian government.

101> То второй начинает пенять на ЭДСУ.

Пенять - это значит жаловаться. Я же на ЭДСУ не жаловался, а наоборот хвалил.

Насчет статической неустойчивости я тоже упоминал в том плане, что при наличии её самолет легче управляется так как более "отзывчив" на "пожелания" пилота.

В обоих случаях капитан Очевидность рулит.

101> Это чисто истребительная фишка, не ударная. И я не вижу в облике планера F-16 многофункицональности от природы.

Но ведь бомбометание по реактору Озирак продемонстрировало способность Ф-16 бомбить в пикировании простым железом с высокой точностью. Тогда откуда сомнения в планере Фалкона?